External Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment: An Applied Urban General Equilibrium Analysis by Niels Vermeer & Wouter Vermeulen
External Benefits of 
Brownfield 
Redevelopment:





CPB Discussion Paper | 178  
 
 
External Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment: 







CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
 
Wouter Vermeulen 
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
VU University 









We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments by Paul Cheshire, Janet Kohlhase, Christina 
Plerhoples  and  our  colleagues  at  CPB.  In  particular,  we  thank  Carel  Eijgenraam  for 
suggesting  the  spatial  setup  of  this  analysis  to  us.  An  earlier  version  of  this  paper  was 
presented  at  57th  Annual  North  American  Meetings  of  the  Regional  Science  Association 
International  in  Denver,  Colorado.  Address  correspondence  to:  Wouter  Vermeulen,  CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, P.O. Box 80510, 2508 GM, The Hague, 
The  Netherlands.  Phone:  +31  70  3383467.  Fax:  +31  70  3383350.  Email: 
w.vermeulen@cpb.nl.   1 
External Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment: 





Does brownfield redevelopment warrant government support? We model external benefits of 
the transformation of an inner city industrial site into a residential area in an urban general 
equilibrium framework,  focussing on the removal  of a local  nuisance, the exploitation  of 
agglomeration economies and preservation of open space at the urban fringe. These benefits 
are compared to the value of transformed land, which accrues to the developer. A numerical 
application indicates that local nuisance and agglomeration effects may push social returns 
significantly beyond these private returns. However, depending on the price elasticity of local 
housing demand, the amount of preserved greenfield land may be small and it only generates 
additional benefits to the extent that direct land use policies fail to internalize its value as open 
space.  
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Externe Effecten van Binnenstedelijke Transformatie:  
Toegepaste Welvaartsanalyse in een Stedelijk Algemeen Evenwichtsmodel 
 
Maatschappelijke  kosten-batenanalyse  (MKBA)  geeft  inzicht  in  de  wenselijkheid  van 
overheidssteun voor binnenstedelijke transformatieprojecten. Externe effecten spelen in de 
MKBA een cruciale rol: in hoeverre zijn marktpartijen niet in staat om projectbaten naar zich 
toe  te  halen?  Dit  paper  verkent  enkele  veelgenoemde  externe  baten  van  binnenstedelijke   2 
transformatie  in  een  stedelijk  algemeen  evenwichtsmodel,  namelijk  het  wegvallen  van  de 
overlast  die  een  industrieterrein  veroorzaakt  in  de  omgeving,  het  benutten  van 
agglomeratievoordelen en de besparing van open ruimte aan de stadsrand. In een numerieke 
toepassing van het model vergelijken we deze baten met de waarde van de herontwikkelde 
grond  in  het  projectgebied.  Door  overlast  en  agglomeratievoordelen  kunnen  de 
maatschappelijke baten significant hoger uitvallen dan deze private baten. De mate waarin 
binnenstedelijke  transformatie  open  ruimte  aan  de  stadsrand  bespaart,  hangt  af  van  de 
gevoeligheid  van  de  lokale  woningvraag  voor  prijzen.  Dit  levert  alleen  additionele 
maatschappelijke baten op als het ruimtelijke ordeningsbeleid aan de stadsrand de waarde van 
deze open ruimte niet internaliseert. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Government  involvement  in  the  regeneration  of  outdated  or  derelict  industrial  sites  in 
centrally located urban  areas is  widespread. Not  only is the remediation of  contaminated 
brownfield sites subsidized in the US and in various European countries, but spatial planning 
policies  also  tend  to  favour  densification  of  land  use  in  existing  urban  areas  over  the 
development of greenfield sites at their fringe. The Dutch government, for instance, aims to 
realize 40% of new housing supply in existing urban areas and a planning target set by the UK 
government even states that 60% of new housing should be provided on previously developed 
land  and  through  the  conversion  of  existing  buildings.
1  The transformation of outdated 
industrial or brownfield sites to residential areas is an obvious channel  for meeting such 
targets.  
  Can government support for inner city redevelopment be justified on the basis of its 
external effects? We deploy an urban general equilibrium model to analyse the welfare effects 
of transforming an inner city industrial site into a residential area. The returns to the developer 
consist of the value of the transformed land. External benefits result from the removal of a 
local nuisance, the exploitation of agglomeration economies and preservation of open space at 
the urban fringe. The contrast between these benefits and the value of the transformed land 
indicates how badly private returns underestimate social returns to the project.  
Our analytical setup may be equally applied to centrally located sites where industrial 
firms are still active or to deserted brownfield sites. In the former case, surrounding residents 
benefit from the removal of noxious emissions, noise or unpleasant smells. Derelict sites may 
pose a health hazard in case of soil contamination  and they sometimes attract vandalism and 
illegal dumping (see e.g., Wright, 1997, for a comprehensive discussion). The presence of this 
type of environmental effects has been borne out in various hedonic studies of urban housing 
markets. For instance, Kaufman and Cloutier (2006) find a substantial negative impact of 
small brownfields on surrounding property values. Kiel and Zabel (2001) similarly report a 
considerable willingness to pay for the cleanup of a closed and abandoned hazardous waste 
site, while Kohlhase (1991) shows  that house prices rebound when such a cleanup has been 
completed.
2  
                                                 
1 See Kaufman and Cloutier (2006) for a discussion of US government support for brownfield regeneration. See 
VROM et al. (2004) and CLG (2010) for policy statements in the Dutch and UK cases respectively.  
2 See also Smith and Desvousges (1986) for an early estimate of the impact of proximity of hazardous waste sites 
on land values.    4 
Brownfield redevelopment and the exploitation of agglomeration benefits have not 
been linked explicitly in the economics literature. However, Rosenthal and Strange (2004) 
survey a large body of evidence on positive returns to urban scale and density, both of which 
are enhanced by the transformation of inner city (former) industrial sites into residential and 
commercial real estate. Furthermore, although this distinction is not explicit in our analysis, 
the advantages of scale and density matter not only for production but also for consumption 
(Glaeser et al., 2001), which may be particularly relevant for inner city areas where consumer 
amenities are mostly concentrated.  
The notion that greenfields near the urban fringe represent a nonmarket value as open 
space is also supported in several empirical studies, see McConnell and Walls (2005) for an 
overview.  In  a  first-best  world,  this  nonmarket  value  would  be  internalized  through  a 
pigouvian tax on development. However, institutional barriers to development taxation may 
exist in reality. For instance, impact fees in the US typically must satisfy a “rational nexus” 
test that ties them to the costs of providing facilities (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004). 
Direct regulation of the use of greenfield land may be similarly hindered by protection of the 
property rights of its owners. Hence, in a second-best world, there is a possible scope for 
subsidization of brownfield redevelopment as a means to preserve open space.  
The amount of land that will be preserved depends on demand for housing in the city. 
Quigley and Swoboda (2007) and Walsh (2007) consider the extreme case of a closed city, in 
which this substitution effect is largest.
3 At the other extreme, brownfield redevelopment will 
not directly affect the demand for land at the urban fringe, if households regard alternative 
cities as sufficiently close substitutes, as in the open city model. We consider the intermediate 
case of downward sloping demand for housing in the city, by assuming that households differ 
in their taste for some unique amenity or attribute on offer. Hence, demand for housing in the 
transformed area is downward sloping as well. The implications of this realistic extension of 
the  standard  urban  model  for  welfare  analysis  have  scarcely  been  investigated  in  the 
literature.
4 
Our research was motivated by a recent series of applications for grants of the Dutch 
government to support urban redevelopment projects, which all had to be founded on a  cost-
benefit analysis (CPB  and PBL,  2010,  provides an overview).  External effects  featured 
                                                 
3 These studies show that local provision of open space may be ineffective because it spurs the conversion of 
agricultural land at other sites, yet the underlying mechanism is the same: if restrictions on housing supply in one 
place raise development elsewhere, then the new supply that is generated through inner city redevelopment 
should reduce development elsewhere. 
4 Standard urban economic theory assumes that cities are either open or closed, see e.g. Fujita (1989). Our 
extension with heterogeneity in tastes and places follows Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2010).   5 
prominently in most of these applications. The analysis in this paper provides a theoretical 
basis for their assessment, as well as a quantitative intuition for the order of magnitude and its 
key determinants. We calibrate our model to a representative project in the medium-sized 
town of Nijmegen, which proposed moving an industrial site from its centre to the outer 
fringe, partly to get rid of unpleasant smells from a producer of tomato ketchup and a large 
abattoir, and redeveloping it with residential real estate.  
 
 
2  Derivation of CBA from the monocentric model 
 
We consider a circular city in which a sector ω is available for urban use. All jobs are located 
in  a  dimensionless  Central  Business  District  (CBD).  The  industrial  site  or  brownfield 
surrounds this CBD up to a distance r
a. Households live in the area that ranges from r
a to the 
urban fringe r
b, which will be endogenized in an extension of the model. The opportunity cost 
of urban land use is foregone agricultural production and open space. Production in the CBD 
exhibits external increasing returns to scale F(N), where N denotes the number of households 
or jobs in the city, while the industrial land yields some constant return P that may equal zero 
in the case of a derelict brownfield site. Industrial land reduces the environmental quality E(r) 
in its vicinity through noise, stench or other externalities. The project involves conversion of 
the  site  into  a  residential  area,  which  eradicates  the  reduction  in  environmental  quality. 
Structures and plot sizes in the existing city will not be adjusted because of durability. 
 
2.1  Equilibrium on urban housing and labour markets 
 
The city has some unique feature and households vary in their appreciation for it. This unique 
feature may either reflect some nonreproducible amenity or personal history – people who 
grew up in an area are more strongly attached to it. Following the setup of Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud (2010), we enter the taste for residing in the city as a random component into the 
household  utility  function.  More  formally,  the  city  is  part  of  a  country  inhabited  by  a 
continuum  I  of  households  indexed  by  i.  Utility  is  additively  separable  into  a  common 
component v and the random component that is specific to each household i, giving: 
u i v i .                    (1) 
Random components are drawn from a common distribution with cumulative density function 
F(ε). The households with the highest draw sort into our city and since this draw does not   6 
depend on their location within the city, they should all receive the same common utility 
level.
5 We assume the rest of the country to be large, so th at the reservation utility  u that 
households can attain elsewhere is exogenous. For the marginal household in the city  i  it 
must hold that  u i u and hence  i u v . We thus obtain the number of households 
that choose to live into the city as: 
1
D N v I F u v .                  (2) 
This  equation  may  be  interpreted  as  a  demand  equation  for  housing  in  the  city:  more 
households will be attracted when a higher common utility level is on offer. It is downward 
sloping in prices, since the common utility level depends negatively on land rents.  
Apart from their idiosyncratic taste for living in the city, households are homogeneous 
and they derive utility from the size of the plot of land s on which they live and from the 
consumption  of  a  composite  commodity  z.  Proximity  to  the  industrial  site  reduces  their 
wellbeing  because  it  reduces  the  environmental  quality.  The  common  utility  function  is 
written as  ,, U s z E r  and in a spatial equilibrium, it should equal v. This condition may be 
inverted in order to obtain  ,, Z s E r v , the amount of z a household in the city requires in 
order to obtain v given s and E(r).  
  Households provide one unit of labour for which they receive a wage w. Commuting 
costs  are  given  by  tr,  where  t  is  the  transport  cost  per  unit  of  distance.  The  bid  rent  or 




w tr Z v s E r
r w v
s
,              (3) 
where the price of z is normalized to one. In a spatial equilibrium, rents should be equal to bid 
rents. The first-order condition associated with (3) reads 
, , , , w tr Z v s
ss
E r Z v s E r
.              (4) 
This expression states the usual condition that the marginal rate of substituting the composite 
commodity for land should equal their rate of exchange at market prices. The lot size function 
,, s r w v  that satisfies this condition solves the consumer problem. We assume that the size 
of structures and plots in the existing city is not affected by the project, which means that 
                                                 
5 Suppose, on the contrary, that common utility were higher in one particular location. Irrespective of the random 
draw they had received, households from the rest of the city would move to this place until higher land prices 
had undone the common utility differential.    7 
condition (4) is not satisfied. In that case, bid rents are obtained by substituting an exogenous 
lot size function into (3).  
  Each plot will be used for the construction of one house that will accommodate one 
household. Urban housing supply is thus obtained by integrating plot density over the entire 







s r w v
.                  (5) 
For each wage level, the equilibrium number of households 
* Nw  and common utility level 
* vw  are obtained by equating this supply to housing demand from expression (2). Figure 1 
illustrates  the  urban  housing  market  using  our  calibrated  model.  Note  that  urban  housing 
supply is downward sloping in the common utility level, since households will demand larger 
plots in order to attain a higher common utility level.  
  Since  each  household  provides  one  unit  of  labour,  the  equilibrium  number  of 
households 
* Nw  may also be interpreted as a labour supply equation. In the CBD, labour is 
the single input in the production of a good that is traded on international markets for a price 
normalized to unity, employing a production technology of the shape  N N g N F , where 
gN may be thought of as an increasing concave function of the urban employment level. 
The marginal product of labour is  N N g N g ' , but individual firms ignore the impact of 
wage setting on  N, so  that  they pay labour its  average product  N g . Hence, the labour 
market is in equilibrium when wages are set at such a level that  
* w g N w .                     (6) 
In addition, there is a stability condition: the cost of attracting an additional household must 
exceed its average product. We assume that there is a unique stable equilibrium on the urban 
labour market and we denote the equilibrium wage and number of households by w
* and N
* 
respectively. Figure 2 illustrates labour demand and supply curves in our calibrated model. 
There are two intersections and only the second one is stable.  
 
2.2  Welfare analysis 
 
The welfare effects of converting the industrial site into a residential area may be decomposed 
into three constituents: the cleaning or decontamination and conversion of the site require an   8 
investment  cost  Q  and  the  project  induces  changes  in  producer  and  consumer  surplus. 
Producer surplus is defined as the difference between the value of the urban produce and all 
costs that have to be made in order to ensure the equilibrium common utility level. This 
surplus is measured relative to the value of land in agriculture and open space, so it equals the 
profit of an urban developer who buys land from farmers, compensates society for the loss of 
open space and then rents it out to households and firms. Consumer surplus changes through 
adjustment of the common utility level – note that it would be absent in the limiting (open 
city) case in which household tastes are homogeneous. 
  Let  v0,  w0  and  N0  denote  the  equilibrium  common  utility  level,  wage  and 
corresponding number of households prior to the project respectively. These are obtained by 
substituting the residential area that ranges from r
a to r
b for L in equation (5) and then solving 
it simultaneously with equations (2) and (6). Conversion of land to urban use costs C per unit 
per year plus annual opportunity costs that consist of value in agricultural production pA and 
open space V. Prior to the redevelopment project, the producer surplus reads: 








Z v s E S F N PL r dr tr r n r dr p V C L r d r r ,(7) 
where  0 0 0 ,, sr s w r v ,  2 L r r ,  00 n r L r s r  and  0 Er  reflects nuisances 
caused by the brownfield site. The first two terms in this expression represent the value of the 
produce in the CBD and on the industrial site. The third term reflects commuting costs and the 
expenditure on the composite commodity that is required in order to ensure a common utility 
level of v0 for all households. Opportunity and conversion costs of the urban land are included 









S p V C L r dr p V C L r d Pr r ,      (8) 
where  0 0 0 ,, r w v r . Hence it is seen to equal the total differential land rent, defined 
here as the difference between land rents and the sum of opportunity and conversion costs.  
  The project changes L in equation (5), the residential area now ranges from the CBD 
to r
b, and it establishes a new environmental quality  1 Er. Lot sizes in the existing urban 
area remain equal to  0 sr  because of durability of structures, but density in the redeveloped 
area  is  endogenous.  Otherwise,  equilibrium  on  urban  housing  and  labour  markets  is 
determined in the same way, yielding v1, w1 and N1 . Producer surplus in this new equilibrium 
is given by:   9 















S F N t Z v s r r n r dr
tr r n r d
Er
Z v s E r r p V C L r dr
      (9) 




A S p V C L r dr r ,               (10) 
where bid rents in the existing area are obtained by substitution of  0 sr  into expression (3). 









S L r dr PL r dr L r d rr r r .        (11) 
  The first term of expression (11) represents the benefits of the project that capitalize 
into  the  price  of  the  redeveloped  land.  These  will  be  taken  into  account  by  a  profit-
maximizing  owner,  so  we  will  refer  to  them  as  the  internal  benefits.  The  second  term 
represents  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  redeveloped  land  and  together  with  the  investment 
costs, it represents the internal costs of the project. The third term represents welfare effects 
that are not internalized into the price of the redeveloped land. They may be decomposed as: 
00 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0
0
00 1 00           
, , , ,









r r Z v s E r Z v s E r n
Z v E r Z v
L r dr r r r dr
N w s r s r r dr E r n
  (12) 
The first  term  in  expression  (12) represents  the external  benefit  of removing a source of 
nuisance for surrounding residents. The new households raise productivity of households who 
were already in the city, which gives rise to the second term. The third term reflects the 
increase in expenditure on the composite commodity that is required to assure the rise in the 
common utility level. In order to attract new households to the city, the common utility level 
must rise and given the fixed lot sizes and environmental quality, this can only occur through 
an increase in consumption of other goods, which must be granted through a discount on land 
prices. Note that this increase may vary with distance to the CBD. 
  In order to obtain the total benefits from the project, we have to augment the change in 
producer surplus as expressed in (11) with a monetary measure for the rise in utility. Three 
groups may be distinguished. Households with a taste  1, where  11 uv , do not enter   10 
the city after the project, so they are indifferent. Households with a taste  0 were already 
in the city prior to the project, so they all experience the same rise in common utility level. As 
we have just seen, this rise materializes through increased co nsumption of the composite 
commodity. Hence, the third term of expression (12) constitutes a  transfer from producers or 
landowners  to  consumers  and  not  an  additional  benefit.
6  The  final  group  with  tastes 
01 ,  consists of new households in the city. The marginal household with taste  1 is 
again indifferent, but there are inframarginal new households who are made better off by the 
project. In order to measure the inframarginal surplus, we compare  0 11 ,, sr Z v E r , the 
consumption of composite commodities at distance r required to sustain the utility distribution 
in the new equilibrium, to  0 1 ,, Z s u r Er , which is the amount that would be required 
for a household with taste ε to sustain the (lower) reservation utility level. Assuming that all 
new households would locate at a distance r from the CBD, a money metric for the utility 
gain of this group would be 
1
0
00 1 1 1 , , , , Z v E r Z u E r M r I s r s r f d ,      (13) 
where f(ε) is the density function that corresponds to the distribution of tastes and I is the 
number of households in the country. An unattractive but unavoidable treat of this metric is 
that it depends on location, which is a consequence of the fundamental property that the 
marginal  utility  of  income  varies  with  distance  to  the  CBD  (Wildasin,  1986).  In  our 
calibration, we arbitrarily evaluate (13) at the average commuting distance  ˆ r  within the newly 
developed area. It has been verified using our calibrated model that this choice is of little 
consequence.  
Table 1 summarizes the costs and benefits of the redevelopment project. In this table, 
the  benefits  of  removing  nuisance  and  increased  scale  have  been  classified  as  external, 
together with the inframarginal surplus. The owner of the redeveloped land would not take 
these  benefits  into  account,  so  they  may  justify  government  intervention.  Hence,  the 
magnitude of these benefits relative to the value of the redeveloped land is an important 
outcome  in  the  policy  debate  on  brownfield  redevelopment.  The  fact  that  this  project 
depresses land rents in the rest of the city along the housing demand curve is inconsequential 
for the CBA.  
 
                                                 
6 For an owner-occupier, this gain in consumer surplus would be exactly offset by the loss in asset value.   11 
2.3  Preservation of open space at the urban fringe 
 
Suppose that the redevelopment project will be finalized in some future year in which demand 
for housing in the city will be higher than it is now. The increase in demand is likely to bring 
forth new development at the urban fringe, some of which may be prevented by the project. In 
this sense the project preserves a certain amount of open space, which may yield additional 
welfare. The effect  is  incorporated into the model  by endogenizing the urban fringe. We 
assume that in order to internalize the value of open space, the local government levies a tax 
on development η, which is independent of whether or not the project takes place. Hence, r
b is 
determined by the condition that:  
,,
b
A w v C r p .                  (14) 
We denote  0
b r  the urban fringe in the situation in which the industrial site is not converted and 
1
b r  the urban fringe if the project is executed. For the project to preserve open space, we must 
have  10
bb rr , although the reverse may also occur if housing demand is sufficiently elastic 
and if scale economies are sufficiently strong.  
















S L r d r r r
p V C
r PL r dr L r dr
L r d r r
        (15) 
The final term in this expression is additional to the welfare effects in expression (11) and it 
represents the value of the preserved open space. If the project is executed, then  1 r  must 
be smaller than  A pC  beyond  1








A p V C r L r dr V L r dr .           (16) 
The right-hand side of this expression is the gap between the value of open space and the 
development tax, multiplied by the surface of the preserved area. It should approximate the 
left-hand side well if  1 r  is not too steep. Hence, if the government is able to internalize 
the value of open space through direct planning policies, there is little additional benefit in 
supporting brownfield conversion. However, legal constraints that are based on the protection 
of property rights may render it difficult to effectively internalize the value of open space at   12 
the urban fringe. In that case, the additional benefit of open space preservation may be more 
substantial.  
  Expressions  for  the  other  welfare  effects,  as  summarized  in  Table  1,  remain 
unchanged, provided that the appropriate v1 and w1 are substituted. If  10
bb rr , then the number 
of new households will be smaller than in the case of an exogenous urban fringe. Hence, the 
agglomeration benefit, the transfer and the inframarginal surplus will be smaller as well, but 
the internal benefits will be larger. Costs of the project and the external benefit of removing 
the nuisance are unaffected.  
 
 
3  Calibration 
 
The  analyses  is  applied  to  the  conversion  of  a  brownfield  of  about  100  hectares,  which 
corresponds to 5% of the total amount of residential land available in the Dutch town of 
Nijmegen. This hypothetical project is chosen significantly larger than the industrial site that 
was considered in the „Nijmegen Waalfront‟ project, so that we get a clearer view on the 
implications of transforming a nonmarginally large site when demand is downward sloping. 
Other urban parameters, such as the share of land developed, the surface of the residential 
area and the number of households, roughly correspond to statistics for Nijmegen. Table 2 
provides a comprehensive overview of the parameters used in subsequent simulations. 
Common  utility  is  assumed  to  be  a  product  of  environmental  quality  and  a  CES 
component in land and the composite commodity. This yields the indirect utility function: 
11 1 ,, v R r Y tr E r E r Y tr R r ,        (17) 
where  1,  Rr denotes the land rent at distance r from the CBD and the price of the 
composite good has been normalized to one. The elasticity of substitution ζ is chosen at 0.5, 
so households are less willing to substitute away from land than in the Cobb-Douglass case 
and land rents have a stronger impact on wellbeing.  
  We assume that the tax on conversion of agricultural land is equal to an external value 
of 5 euro and that conversion costs an additional 4 euro annually, which is roughly in line 
with the numbers reported in Vermeulen (2010). Hence, if we evaluate expression (17) at the 
urban  fringe,  we  can  substitute  Rr  from  the  boundary  condition  (14).  The  average 
household income Y is observed and we make empirically founded assumptions on t (also   13 
based on Vermeulen, 2010) and the shape of  Er, on which more below. By substitution, 
we obtain an equilibrium common utility level v for each assumption on the taste parameters. 
The condition that this v must be the same throughout the city implicitly defines land rents, 
while lot sizes follow from the corresponding compensated demand equation. Substitution 
into the urban housing supply equation (5), prior to the execution of the project, yields the 
number of households in the city and ʱ and β are chosen such that this corresponds to the 
number  we  observe.  This  condition  simultaneously  determines  the  equilibrium  common 
utility level v0. 
  Tastes are Pareto distributed according to the cumulative density function: 
11 F ,                    (18) 
which yields the demand equation: 
D N v I u v .                    (19) 
The  parameter  u  is  set  such  that  0 80,000
D Nv   with  I  =  7  million  −  the  number  of 
households in the Netherlands. The parameter γ is calibrated on the price elasticity of urban 





N v R r Y tr E r Rr
N v R r
,              (20) 
where  r  is the distance of the average household to the CBD. In the baseline, we choose γ 
such that this elasticity equals -2.
7  
  We consider two specifications of  Er that are based on alternative empirical studies 
of  the  impact  of  proximity  to  industrial  sites  on  house  prices  in  the  Netherlands.  First, 














R r R r
e
,        (21) 
where P0 and P1 denote house prices with and without presence of the site respectively. We 
use their estimates for the province of Brabant nearby Nijmegen for η1 to η3, while η4 and the 
dummy  750 1d  ensure that the effect levels off continuously after 750 meters.  These estimates 
of the nuisance effect are conservative compared to other results   in their paper .  Setting 
                                                 
7 This elasticity refers to the price responsiveness of the number of units demanded in a specific city. We are not 
aware of any estimates in the literature, which usually considers the elasticity of housing services demanded with 
respect to prices (see e.g. Ermisch et al., 1996).   14 
1 1 Er ,  the  function  0 Er   can  be  solved  analytically  by  substituting  land  rents  into 
expression (21). Finally, De Vor and De Groot estimate a house price equation and we model 
the impact on land rents. The share of house prices that is spent on land ρ is roughly equal to 
25% in the centre of Nijmegen. The factor  1  on the right-hand side of expression (21) 
reflects the assumption that the entire effect of nuisance on house prices operates through land 
rents.  
  Our  second  specification  of  Er  is  based  on  Rouwendal  and  Van  der  Straaten 
(2008), who estimate the impact of proximity to industrial sites as: 
10 log log R r R r ,                (22) 
where θ is the percentage of land in industrial use in a circle with a radius of 500 meter 
surrounding the house. We use  0.006, which corresponds to the estimate for Rotterdam, 
where Rouwendal and Van der Straaten found the strongest effect. Expression (22) assumes 
that houses are surrounded by either residential or industrial land, i.e. the nonurban land (of 
which there is a share 1 - ω) is located further away than the 500 meter radius. This leads to 
an overestimation of the impact of the nuisance. The function  0 Er  is obtained from (22) in 
a similar way as before. Both variants are plotted in Figure 3.  
  The urban production function is given by: 
N KN N ,                    (23) 
where κ is the elasticity of average labour productivity with respect to  urban scale  – the 
number of households or jobs in the city. Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey the early 
literature  on  this  elasticity  as  indicating  that  doubling  city  size  raises  productivity  by  an 
amount  that  ranges  from  roughly  3  to  8%.  However,  these  studies  did  not  control  for 
unobserved factors, such as the composition of the local workforce, that recent  work has 
shown to result in downward bias (see in particular Combes  et al., 2008). Therefore, we 
somewhat conservatively choose κ = 0.02.
8 The constant K is chosen such that in the baseline 
equilibrium,  the  predicted  wage  in  Nijmegen  equals  the  observed  average  disposable 
household income.  
 
 
                                                 
8 In an applied general equilibrium analysis of US county-level employment, Chatterjee (2006) also chooses a 
scale-elasticity  of  0.02,  following  essentially  the  same  line  of  reasoning.  This  study  illustrates  that  such  a 
seemingly small elasticity can still have a substantial impact on the spatial distribution of jobs.     15 
4  Results 
 
Figure 4 shows land rents in the residential sector prior to and after the redevelopment project 
for the baseline scenario, where the urban fringe is held constant. The change in these land 
rents  reflects  the  change  in  producer  surplus.  In  the  project  area  itself,  extending  to  one 
kilometre from the CBD, any rents of land in alternative use should be subtracted. Rents of 
residential land close to the industrial site rise substantially, because of removal of nuisance. 
However, land rents further away fall because of downward sloping demand, which appears 
to  dominate  the  agglomeration  effect.  Finally,  note  the  slight  dip  in  land  rents  near  the 
boundary between the residential and the redeveloped industrial land, which is a consequence 
of fixing lot sizes in the existing city: these lot sizes would have been optimal in the presence 
of  nuisance  but  after  its  removal  they  are  too  large.  Lot  sizes  and  consumption  of  the 
composite commodity that corresponds to this figure are documented in Appendix Figures A1 
and A2 respectively.  
  Table 3 shows costs and benefits of the project as obtained in Table 1 for the baseline 
project, as well as for two projects that are smaller and larger by a factor four. The number of 
additional households in the city equals 4814 in the baseline project and internal benefits 
amount to almost 17 million euros annually, corresponding to a present value of 330 million 
euros at a discount rate of 5%. The external benefit of removing a nuisance to surrounding 
residents, based on the estimates from De Vor and De Groot (2010), constitutes 10% of these 
internal benefits and external agglomeration benefits are worth another 15%. Hence, total 
benefits  are  substantially  larger  than  what  an  owner  of  the  site  would  consider  in  her 
investment decision. The benefit to new consumers is negligible compared to the internal 
benefits, yet there is a substantial transfer from landowners to consumers who lived in the city 
already prior to the project.  
  The internal benefits, the agglomeration benefits and the transfer rise more or less 
proportionally  with  the  size  of  the  redeveloped  site.  However,  the  relative  importance  of 
removing the nuisance declines. The reason is that this effect is only external to the extent that 
it  crosses  the  boundary  of  the  industrial  site,  whereas  within  this  boundary  it  is  fully 
internalised in land rents. For a larger (circular) site, the area within is larger compared to the 
area at the fringe, so the owner will take a larger share of the nuisance into account. The 
inframarginal surplus rises more than proportionally with the size of the project, since new   16 
households have an ever lower taste for living in the city. For the largest project in Table 3, 
this benefit is almost as large as the benefit of removing the nuisance.  
  Table 4 investigates the impact of demand elasticity on costs and benefits and it is 
based on the alternative estimate of the nuisance effect from Rouwendal and Van der Straaten 
(2008). Comparison of the second column of this table with the second column of Table 3, 
which has the same demand elasticity, shows that the external effect due to removal of the 
nuisance is almost equally large for both specifications. The less elastic demand, the lower the 
direct benefits, but roughly half of this loss is offset by a rise in inframarginal surplus. The 
transfer falls with demand elasticity. In the case of infinitely elastic demand, in which tastes 
for living in the city do not vary across households, inframarginal surplus and transfer are 
absent. Agglomeration benefits rise slightly with demand elasticity and the nuisance effect 
does not depend on it at all.  
  The impact of the strength of agglomeration economies is illustrated in Table 5. This 
table indicates that agglomeration benefits rise proportionally with the scale elasticity and it 
also identifies a minor positive impact on internal benefits.  
  Table 6 shows how the value of preserved open space, the final term in equation (15), 
depends on key model parameters. Demand elasticity varies over columns in a similar way as 
in Table 4. Agglomeration externalities are assumed to be absent in the upper panel while the 
scale elasticity equals 0.02 in the lower panel, just as in the baseline model. Within each 
panel, we vary the value of open space  V while holding the development tax  η constant. 
Consider the upper panel first. With a demand elasticity of -2, redevelopment of a brownfield 
site of about 100 hectares preserves an area of open space at the urban fringe of about 50 
hectares. The resulting benefit is negligible if its value is fully internalized through land use 
policy at the urban fringe. If the value of open space is twice as high as the development tax 
(V – η = 5), then the additional benefit rises to about 15% of the internal benefits. The amount 
of open space that is preserved and the benefit this generates fall with demand elasticity. In 
the  limiting  case  of  infinitely  elastic  demand,  the  redevelopment  project  does  not  reduce 
development at the urban fringe at all.  
  The presence of agglomeration externalities renders development at the urban fringe 
more attractive, which is partly reflected in the price of land at newly developed sites. Hence, 
with  a demand elasticity  of  -2 and  a scale elasticity of 0.02, redevelopment of the same 
brownfield site of about 100 hectares now preserves an area of open space of only about 30 
hectares. If demand is sufficiently elastic, then the project may even increase development at 
the urban fringe – about 120 hectares in the case of an infinite elasticity. This yields additional   17 
costs rather than benefits if planning policies at the fringe are not capable of internalizing the 
value  of  open  space.  As  documented  in  Appendix  Table  A1,  which  provides  a  complete 
overview  of  the  costs  and  benefits  that  correspond  to  the  lower  panel  of  Table  6, 
agglomeration benefits are also affected by adjustment of the urban fringe. Preservation of 
open space means that fewer households enter the city so that the rise in productivity is lower 
than in a scenario in which it is held exogenous. In contrast, the extension of the urban fringe 
that occurs if demand is sufficiently elastic leads to higher agglomeration benefits. Hence, it 
may even be desirable to impose a development tax below the value of open space, since its 
loss is compensated by a productivity gain.  
 
 
5  Conclusions and discussion 
 
Government intervention in the land market is the traditional domain of planners and until 
recently, cost-benefit analysis was rarely used to evaluate it.
9 This paper has analysed costs 
and benefits of brownfield redevelopment, which may be regarded as an important aspect of 
planning in several European countries that pursue densification of land use in existing urban 
areas. External benefits of redeveloping brownfield land have been formally modelled in an 
urban general equilibrium framework,  which provides a solid theoretical basis for applied 
cost-benefit analysis. A carefully calibrated numerical application has shed light on the order 
of magnitude of effects under alternative parameter assumptions.  
  We have found that brownfield redevelopment may yield substantial external benefits 
through the exploitation of urban agglomeration economies and the rem oval of nuisances. 
Hence, local landowners would underinvest in such projects and government intervention 
may be warranted. However, preservation of open space does not appear to be a relevant 
consideration from a welfare economic point of view, unless gov ernments are unable to 
internalize the value of open space directly through planning policies at the urban fringe and 
the demand for housing in the city is sufficiently inelastic. With elastic demand, development 
pressure at the urban fringe may even  increase because of agglomeration economies.  This 
insight  is  of  relevance,  since  planners  and  policymakers  often  advocate  brownfield 
redevelopment as a strategy to preserve greenfield land.  
                                                 
9 Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) pioneered the  welfare economics of land use regulation, see Cheshire and 
Vermeulen (2009) for a recent overview.   18 
  Redevelopment projects induce a transfer from landowners to consumers in the rest of 
the city that may be substantial, depending on the housing demand elasticity. This effect may 
lead to opposition from landowners, as in Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2010). On the other 
hand, the nuisance is likely capitalized into the price of plots surrounding the industrial site, 
so their owners stand to gain from the project. A property tax will mitigate these effects and a 
confiscatory „Henry George tax‟ on differential land rents would fully eliminate them, but this 
type of tax is rarely observed in practice. Policymakers may want to take such distributional 
concerns into consideration.  
  Finally,  our  results  should  not  be  interpreted  as  unqualified  support  for  current 
government  involvement  in  brownfield  redevelopment  and  densification  of  land  use  in 
existing urban areas. Even if the value of redeveloped land underestimates social returns, 
these returns may still be surpassed by the costs of transformation projects. Moreover, the 
supply  of  redevelopable  land  is  likely  upward  sloping,  so  a  strong  commitment  to 
densification will lead planners to consider increasingly more expensive sites. Well-informed 
policymaking will require a careful and empirically founded analysis of the costs and benefits 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Costs and benefits of the redevelopment project 
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Table 2: Parameters 
Description of parameter  Value 
Utility   
ʱ  preference parameter composite good  0.998515 
β  preference parameter land  0.001485 
ζ  elasticity of substitution  0.5 
v0
*  equilibrium common utility level   19287.3 
u  reservation utility level   20039.6 
N  total number of households in the city prior to the project  80,000 
I  number of households in the Netherlands  7 million 
γ  parameter of the Pareto distribution   0.675156 
     
Environmental externality   
η1  parameters of logistic decay function for proximity to 
industrial sites from De Vor and De Groot (2010) 
9.168764 
η2  -1.717655 
η3  0.012687 
η4  -1.49752 
δ  semi-elasticity of house prices with respect to (minus) the 
share of surrounding land within 500 meter in industrial use 
from Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008) 
0.006 
     
Urban form   
ra  boundary of brownfield area  1 km 
rb  outer city boundary  4504.61 m 
ω  share of land in development  0.33 
L  total surface of residential area prior to project  2000 ha 
t  annual commuting costs per meter  0.45 €/m 
ρ  share of house price spent on land  25% 
pA + C  annualized price of agricultural land plus conversion costs  4 €/m
2 
V  external value of agricultural land as open space  5 €/m
2 
     
Production   
w  annual wage  26,000 
κ  scale elasticity  0.02 
K  constant in production function  20744.9 
Note: Information on the number of households and residential land use in Nijmegen is obtained from Statistics 
Netherlands and information on the average household income in Nijmegen is obtained from its municipal 
government.  Commuting  costs  and  the  conversion  and  opportunity  costs  of  agricultural  land  are  based  on 
Vermeulen (2010), the external value corresponds to the smaller cities in the sample of that paper. 
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Table 3: CBA for baseline, small and large project 
  small project  baseline project  large project 
  ra
  = 0.5 km  ra
  = 1 km  ra
  = 2 km 
Internal effects       
Benefits  4.30  16.54  61.73 
Costs  0.26 P + Q  1.04 P + Q  4.15 P + Q 
       
External benefits       
Removal of nuisance  0.98  1.59  2.67 
Agglomeration benefit  0.63  2.43  8.80 
Inframarginal surplus  0.01  0.19  2.23 
       
Transfers       
To old households  1.72  6.37  20.06 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
and De Groot (2010). The urban fringe is exogenous.  
 
Table 4: CBA for alternative environmental externality and demand elasticities 
  demand elasticity  demand elasticity  demand elasticity 
  εD = -1  εD = -2 (baseline)  εD = -∞ 
Internal effects       
Benefits  16.16  16.54  16.95 
Costs  1.04 P + Q  1.04 P + Q  1.04 P + Q 
       
External benefits       
Removal of nuisance  1.86  1.86  1.86 
Agglomeration benefit  2.40  2.43  2.47 
Inframarginal surplus  0.38  0.19  0 
       
Transfers       
To old households  12.53  6.36  0 
Note:  Amounts  are  measured  in  millions  of  euros  per  year.  The  environmental  externality  is  based  on 
Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008). The urban fringe is exogenous.  
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Table 5: CBA for baseline and alternative scale elasticities 
  scale elasticity  scale elasticity  scale elasticity 
  κ = 0  κ = 0.01  κ = 0.03 
Internal effects       
Benefits  16.39  16.46  16.61 
Costs  1.04 P + Q  1.04 P + Q  1.04 P + Q 
       
External benefits       
Removal of nuisance  1.59  1.59  1.59 
Agglomeration benefit  0  1.21  3.66 
Inframarginal surplus  0.19  0.19  0.20 
       
Transfers       
To old households  6.34  6.35  6.38 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
and De Groot (2010). The urban fringe is exogenous.  
 
Table 6: Value of preserved open space 
  demand elasticity  demand elasticity  demand elasticity 
  εD = -1  εD = -2 (baseline)  εD = -∞ 
κ = 0       
V – η = 0  0.15  0.07  0 
V – η = 1  0.85  0.54  0 
V – η = 2  1.55  1.02  0 
V – η = 5  3.64  2.44  0 
κ = 0.02       
V – η = 0  0.12  0.03  0.12 
V – η = 1  0.73  0.33  -1.08 
V – η = 2  1.34  0.63  -2.28 
V – η = 5  3.16  1.52  -5.88 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
and De Groot (2010).   
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A1: Extended CBA for Table 6, lower panel (κ = 0.02) 
  demand elasticity  demand elasticity  demand elasticity 
  εD = -1  εD = -2 (baseline)  εD = -∞ 
Internal effects       
Benefits  16.43  16.59  17.07 
Costs  1.04 P + Q  1.04 P + Q  1.04 P + Q 
       
External benefits       
Removal of nuisance  1.59  1.59  1.59 
Agglomeration benefit  1.33  1.91  4.56 
Inframarginal surplus  0.12  0.12  0 
Preserved open space       
     V – η = 0  0.12  0.03  0.12 
     V – η = 1  0.73  0.33  -1.08 
     V – η = 2  1.34  0.63  -2.28 
     V – η = 5  3.16  1.52  -5.88 
       
Transfers       
To old households  7.07  5.03  0 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
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